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Abstract 
The development and maintenance of network and data security in software systems is done in 
a late phase of design and coding or during deployment, often in an ad-hoc manner. Network 
monitoring and recovery, encryption protocols, best practices for combating cyber-crime, or 
disaster recovery planning are useful methodologies applied to enforce security of a deployed 
system. Nevertheless these are not enough to protect from attacks directed to software 
vulnerabilities hidden at design and code level.   
Introducing security aspects in all the phases of the software development process is an 
emerging approach to limit costs of adding security features when it's too late and very expensive 
in terms of time and resources. In this paper we illustrate some proposals to consider security 
issues in the software process from the early phase of requirements to design and coding. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Network security in all its aspects has become more crucial in recent years, in terms of protecting 
and preserving corporate data and network resources in cases of attacks and disruption. A 
complementary and needed strategy is building secure software applications. These are key-
enabler for the development of complex services integrated through open standard interfaces, but 
currently the security concerns are often considered after deployment, when attacks or security 
bugs are found and it is very expensive to fix the problems: that is because the implementation of 
security features is widespread through several software modules and it is not fully understood by 
the majority of developers.  
This is mainly due to the fact that software engineering and security engineering are quite 
independent disciplines.  The two research and practitioners communities are just starting to 
collaborate, most often security experts are not software engineering experts and vice versa, the 
software engineering process does not consider security concerns in depth.  
As a result, security issues are often considered only too late (when the system is deployed), with 
high economical costs, both for fixing the software security bugs and for losses in services or 
products. 
The introduction of engineering-style development for secure software systems requires different 
methodologies for different process phases; moreover the process has to be designed having 
security issues in mind, and additional process-related activities (such as the definition of security 
requirements or security inspections) have to be considered.  
Before to proceed, we want to underline that all other facets of system/software dependability (like 
reliability, safety, and availability) are not within the focus of this paper: we mean security in the 
definition given by the Common Criteria [2], e.g.: confidentiality, access control, protection, 
integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, etc... 
In the next sections we will discuss existing approaches to introduce security early in the software 
development process. Then we describe new proposals we consider necessary to enhance state-of-
the-art. 
 
2. Existing approaches  
Among the existing approaches, we briefly describe some existing solutions; for example there are 
ideas for enhancing UML with security, different tools to check and correct security vulnerabilities 
in the source code; moreover Aspect-Oriented Programming is used to separate security concerns 
from service logic code, in order to obtain a more modular and maintainable source code. 
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2.1 Security at design level 
Given the widespread use of UML it is important to include explicitly in a formalized manner the 
security characteristics of a system within UML diagrams. Such additional information can be 
added using stereotypes and attributes in the easiest case, or by means of UML extensions if 
necessary. When design models (UML) are annotated with security related information it is 
possible to carry on automatic verification of the design. Such tools enable the identification of 
defects and security threats as early as possible in the life cycle, thus reducing the cost of their 
correction.  
SecureUML is a proposal for a UML profile for security; more specifically, SecureUML extends 
UML to support authorization constraints. The capability of specifying significant information 
related to access control, and of deriving complete access control infrastructures (using EJB 
components), is presented in [11]. Basically, SecureUML defines a set of stereotypes and uses 
them to automatically produce the code that controls how users can access the different parts of the 
application. These stereotypes only consider the static parts of UML; dynamic ones are part of the 
future work.  
A more ambitious UML profile is UMLsec [14]. In this case, the approach is quite different: it 
extends statecharts and component diagrams to enforce the following security requirements: fair 
exchange, secrecy/confidentiality, secure information flow, and secure communication link. The 
author describes the notation with a formal semantics based on Abstract State Machines language, 
to precisely analyse designed models. The main goals of UMLsec are: 
• Evaluate UML specifications for vulnerabilities in design. 
• Encapsulate established rules of security engineering. 
• Make available to developers not specialized in security a simpler way to check UML 
models 
• Consider security from early design phases 
• Make verification cost-effective 
UMLsec offers mostly-used security requirements as stereotypes with tags (secrecy, integrity, 
etc…); it uses associated constraints to evaluate specifications and indicate possible 
vulnerabilities; it ensures that stated security requirements enforce given security policy and that 
UML specification satisfies the defined requirements. 
Among the mandatory requirements, UMLsec provides basic security requirements such as 
secrecy and integrity and it allows considering different threat scenarios depending on adversary 
strengths. Moreover it allows including important security concepts and mechanisms (e.g. access 
control) and it provides security primitives (e.g. (a)symmetric encryption). 
The main goal of UMLsec is to automatically check security properties on an extended UML 
model, stored in XMI standard format; then this model can be checked by a formal tool [19] to 
verify security requirements. 
 
2.2 Security and AOP  
An emerging approach, coping with design and coding, is to express security issues with Aspect-
Oriented Programming (AOP) [12]: with this approach security experts write security code in 
aspects and developers write application logic: then the designer uses particular tools (called 
aspect-weavers) to generate at compile-time the complete application code. Aspect-Oriented 
programming extensions to common programming languages (like AspectJ [4] for Java and 
Aspectc [5] for C++) have become widespread and more stable in recent years as a way for 
developers to obtain a more modular code even for crosscutting concerns like security. Usually 
design decisions on how and where inserting security aspects are made by developers, instead of 
designers. This does not fully protect against the introduction of security bugs due to developer’s 
inexperience in security. What is missing is a methodology to integrate AOP at design level in 
order to delegate compositions rules of aspects to designers and security experts and not to 
developers. This goal could be achieved with extensions of UML for AOP: different ideas have 
been recently proposed [6] [10] to cover this issue, and a working group in UML standardization 
body is currently trying to introduce these extensions in the upcoming UML 2.0. 
The AOP approach will allow developers to design applications in a security conscious way from 
the ground up, instead of applying security in an ad hoc manner during and after development. To 
reach this goal: developers should be able to write secure programs easily, without having to be 
security experts; developers should be able to apply security to legacy source code, without 
requiring revisions to the legacy code; developers should be able to apply security to COTS 
components for which they do not have source code.  
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AOP approach can be used by the security expert to handle, for example,  SSL communications 
between components, or certificates exchange in a modular way. A key advantage offered by AOP 
is the possibility to change security parts of applications even in a later phase of design and 
implementation with a minimal cost, allowing to use more flexible software development 
processes.  
 
2.3 Security at code level 
Modern programming languages and systems provide much support for security. Through strong 
typing, they can substantially reduce the opportunities for coding errors that could result in buffer 
overflows and other vulnerabilities. They also allow protection by encapsulation and in addition, 
they sometimes include rich security infrastructures, for example libraries for authentication and 
digital signature. Although common programming languages are not primarily concerned with 
security, there is also the need of developing compilers considering secure programming issues, in 
order to give the possibility to developers to build more trustworthy code without being security 
gurus. For instance, access-control techniques that depend on the contents of the execution stack 
have been already investigated [13] and they trigger discussions on how to enhance programming 
languages in order to cope these issues; but until these problems are not faced by main compiler 
vendors, there will not be a widespread diffusion of these to industry. Currently, instead, the main 
approach is based on making a deeper debugging using tools that recognize bad design-patterns in 
source code, which can expose security vulnerabilities. This is due to the fact that most security 
attacks exploit instances of well-known classes of implementation flaws. Many of these flaws 
could be detected and eliminated before software is deployed. These problems continue to be 
present with growing frequency, not because they are not sufficiently understood by the security 
community, but because techniques for preventing them have not been integrated into the software 
development process phase of verification and validation of source code. Different strategies, more 
or less automated, can be used to find out security vulnerabilities at source code level.  
Following the classification of [16] we can list these main classes of security vulnerabilities. 
Buffer-overflow is one of the most common problems of bad programming that hides memory-
handling vulnerabilities that can be exploited in a Denial-of-Service attack; buffers, such as strings 
and arrays, can only contain a limited amount of data. When too much data is input to the buffer, it 
can overflow, overwriting other parts of memory and allowing new code to be inserted and 
executed. Another problem is due to race conditions, which happen when more than one thread 
(process) are competing for the same resource. A malicious program could attempt to grab 
resources before anyone else can get them, creating a problem of loss of secrecy and integrity. 
Another issue to be considered are format strings: these define how the output of a command will 
be formatted. If an untrusted source has the ability to dictate what format strings will be used in a 
formatting command, such as print, the control can be leveraged to overwrite arbitrary memory 
locations just like a buffer overflow attack. 
Another issue is trust management: developers often make poor decisions about who and what to 
trust. Servers should only trust one another if absolutely necessary to meet requirements. A 
firewall does not remove the need to secure those servers behind it.  
Moreover, database account names and passwords are often hard coded into client applications 
that need access. These names and passwords can be pulled out and used to access the database 
directly. Other attacks on databases included bypassing poorly set up access controls, statistical 
inference attacks, and they can be damaged by malicious input.  
Malicious input is the one received from users and external systems, which may be structured to 
maliciously affect the behaviour of the program. This input should be checked to ensure it adheres 
to the allowed values before it is used.  
Latest but not least, bad implemented cryptography and cryptographic algorithms with known 
flaws can both lead to severe vulnerabilities. Whenever possible, widely reviewed cryptographic 
libraries should be used. Finally, as cryptography relies on random numbers, without a good 
source of random numbers, the cryptographic output will be weaker. If an attacker can guess what 
random numbers you are getting, they will be able to decipher the message with cryptanalysis. 
In the code development phase, the goal is the protection of data and functions from unauthorized 
access, e.g.: unauthorized read/write of data, unauthorized use of function or service, focus on 
software faults that lead to security leaks. Current strategies are based on tools to find security 
vulnerabilities in the source code. For example, an extensible open-source tool like Splint [15] 
uses lightweight static analysis to detect common security vulnerabilities (including buffer 
overflows and format string vulnerabilities) and can be extended to detect new vulnerabilities. 
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Instead Flawfinder [18] is a program that examines source code and reports possible security 
weaknesses (``flaws'') sorted by risk level. It's very useful for quickly finding and removing at 
least some potential security problems during debugging. Flawfinder works by using a built-in 
database of C/C++ functions with well-known problems, such as buffer overflow risks, format 
string problems, race conditions, and poor random number acquisition. Flawfinder produces a list 
of ``hits'' (potential security flaws), sorted by risk in descendant order. This risk level depends not 
only on the function, but also on the values of the parameters of the function. For example, 
constant strings are often less risky than fully variable strings in many contexts. In some cases, 
Flawfinder may be able to determine that the construct isn't risky at all.  
Not every hit is actually a security vulnerability, and not every security vulnerability is necessarily 
found. In fact, Flawfinder doesn't really understand the semantics of the code at all - it primarily 
does simple text pattern matching (though it does ignore comments and strings as it should). 
Anyway, Flawfinder can be a very useful aid in a coarse-grained finding and removing of security 
vulnerabilities. 
Finally, RATS [16] as its name states, it is a “Rough Auditing Tool for Security “, because it 
performs only a rough analysis of source code. It will not find every error and will also find things 
that are not errors (false positives). 
Better tools are based on formal methods but for space reason we will not describe them here.  
 
3. New proposals 
In Figure 1 the different phases of a generic process are mapped to different methodologies used to 
introduce security at different levels of the software development process; in the next paragraphs 
we will describe some proposals to integrate these currently separated methodologies and tools. 
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Figure 1. Mapping of methodologies and tools for secure software to the process 
 
3.1 Process 
 
Definition and validation of a software process capable of handling the security issue from the 
very beginning is a key issue: this must be capable of integrating tools, methods and organization 
in the most suitable way. As all these tools and techniques come from different domains and are 
tailored for particular systems and languages, in future they should have to be meaningfully 
integrated in a comprehensive process. This is currently an open issue and a desirable goal in order 
to have better results and faster development; these are key aspects for a broad adoption by 
industry. 
As security requirements often change in time, because of discovering new attacks and protocols’ 
faults, the process must be enough agile to permit fast correction of security bugs. 
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The necessary condition for agility is having security requirements traceability through design and 
code; moreover it will be useful to include external prerequisites (derived from standards, laws, 
regulations etc.) in a prescriptive way in the models. This leads to better understanding of the 
processes. An explicit process is the basis for measurement, evaluation and improvement; and for 
external security process assessments. 
All these goals can be met with different actions, like: elicitation of industrial practices with 
respect to security, process modelling, process instrumentation with measures, process analysis 
(identification of potential improvements), use of security entry/exit conditions. These conditions 
formally define if and how to proceed from one phase to the other of the process: on the one side 
they can enforce application of inspections and other practices, and on the other side can sensibly 
improve the quality of the final product. 
 
3.2 Security Requirements  
 
Developing methods and tools to specify and analyse security requirements from the very 
beginning is a fundamental issue to merge software development and security. 
While there is a stringent need to increase the importance of security in software engineering 
curricula, not all software engineers will be ever able to become security experts, and vice versa.  
A promising approach is to delegate security concerns to security experts and use methodologies 
and tools to integrate the separate work in a final common result. 
Among methodologies for the detection of defects in earlier phases, one is based on security 
inspections. Inspecting documents for security (such as requirements or design documents) would 
further contribute to finding security risks. Early detection of defects with respect to security leads 
to reduction of rework efforts. Inspections and reading techniques in general are recognized to be 
effective practices to identify defects in software artefacts, overall when these are delegated to 
security experts. Inspections are complementary to testing, especially for the possibility of using 
them on early phases of the lifecycle. However, inspections are normally targeted to functional 
defects, while there is an emerging need of defining a family of inspection techniques targeted to 
security defects, to be applied on requirements, design and coding artifacts. 
 
3.3 UML and AOP 
Often security is not well understood by all developers of a complex system; forcing every 
developer to change his/her code to be compliant to existing or upcoming security requirements 
could slow the entire development process. AOP can help to have a more agile process of 
maintenance and evolution of security concerns: these tasks can be triggered by new security 
requirements coming out in a later phase of design, during implementation, or, most frequently, 
after deployment when attacks reveal security pitfalls. In this case it is necessary to individuate 
which security concerns are involved and then rewrite the related security aspects: this approach 
can lead to an easier evolution of the system and to a clearer tracing of security requirements 
through design to code. This idea could be implemented with a model-driven architecture able to 
provide designers with a complete set of views of the system. Therefore, there is an urgent need at 
design level of an integration of UML and AOP: it is important to extend UML diagrams with 
AOP constructs to be able to trace aspects (e.g.: security aspects) in classes of applications and to 
give to designers an easier way to control the system development and easily change security 
concerns in a later phase of software process cycle. Different proposals have been recently 
published [10] [7] [9] [8], but a complete theory and related tool are currently lacking. These 
UML extensions are realized extending UML meta-model or extending the notation with ad-hoc 
UML profiles. The real need is increasing as more as possible automation of pointcuts generation 
from design models to aspects’ source code: this is a key issue in order to give full control on 
distribution of security aspects to security designers, without risking to delegate these ones to 
common developers as it frequently happens.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The main problem of current software development is to consider security concerns from the 
beginning of the process. We have presented some existing approaches we have evaluated, and 
some new proposals for further work State of the art is still immature in some parts of the process 
and lot of things are needed to offer a more integrated and reliable solution. We believe that a 
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process-centered view is fundamental to trace security requirements through design and source 
code, and that AOP is a key technology that can lead to a more agile process; this is because 
evolution of security parts of a system is triggered by discovery of new attacks and vulnerabilities: 
what is needed now is the possibility to easily upgrade and secure a system from design until after 
deployment. For a more detailed description of the presented topics we suggest the following texts 
on secure programming [1] [17] and to check out the following references. 
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